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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANA PHELPS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SOCIAL SERVICE AND CHILD WEL-
FARE DEPARTMENT OF THE RE-
LIEF SOCIETY GENERAL BOARD 
ASSOCIATION OF THE CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER - DAY 
SAINTS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10892 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action praying for a Writ of Habeas Cor±ms 
commanding the Defendant to return control and custodl". of 
r 
an infant child. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From an Order, Judg-
ment and Decree for the Defendant, Plaintiff appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment 
in her favor as a matter of law ordering the return of cus-
tody and control of said infant child and quieting to her all 
righ, title, interest or claim to said infant, or that failing, a 
new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 17, 1966, Plaintiff gave birth to an infant. 
(R. 47) Plaintiff was an unwed mother; she has never been 
married nor has she ever been pregnant before. (R. 41) She 
conceived in early March, 1966, but did not become aware 
of her pregnant condition until the last week of August, 
1966. (R. 41; Exhibit 2-P, "Prenatal Record;" R. 40) 
Her pregnancy was discovered upon examination by a 
brother, who was a doctor. Upon discovery he immediately 
demanded that she leave the small Utah town in which they 
were joint residents, (R. 42) and that she place the child, 
when born, for adoption. (R. 42, 115) Another member of 
the family, a sister, also persisted in this advice. (R. 115) 
Plaintiff did leave the area, and upon arrival in Salt 
Lake City, checked in at the University Hospital and was 
seen by Dr. Hebertson, who became her attending physician. 
Dr. Herbertson also suggested that she place the child for 
adoption stating that it would not be right for her to raise 
the child by herself, and without a father for the child, that 
it would be socially wrong. (R. 41, 44) Plaintiff's first visit 
with Dr. Hebertson was on September 1, 1966. (R. 107) On 
the first visit, in addition to the suggestion for placing the 
3 
child, Dr. Hebertson also discussed with Plaintiff the various 
adoption agencies licensed in Utah. ( R. 109) Plaintiff vis-
ited with Dr. Hebertson in his office on ten more occa-
sions before the birth of the baby. Whenever the baby was 
discussed, the doctor repeated his advice that the baby be 
placed for adoption. ( R. 115) 
In connection with a possible adoption, Dr. Hebertson 
referred Plaintiff to a social worker attached to the Univer-
sity Hospital, a Mrs. Bridgewater. (R. 116, 143) Plaintiff 
visited in Mrs. Bridgewater's office and on that occasion the 
matter of adoption was discussed. ( R. 143) Plaintiff also 
indicated to Mrs. Bridgewater that the costs would be a 
problem and that she would have to have help in paying the 
hospital and doctor bills. Mrs. Bridgewater, by telephone, 
made an appointment for Plaintiff with a Mrs. Stewart at 
the Defendant Agency to discuss adoption proceedings. On 
September 28, 1966, Plaintiff met with Mrs. Stewart. On 
that occasion, Mrs. Stewart gave Plaintiff the "benefit of 
my experience" to the effect that it was to the Plaintiff's 
advantage to place the child for adoption (R. 92) and that 
this would be the right thing to do. (R. 47) Plaintiff did not 
sPe Mrs. Stewart again until the day after the birth of the 
child. ( R. 93) Mrs. Stewart did not explain or discuss any 
help whi'ch might be available to Plaintiff if she decided to 
keep the child. (R. 104) In discussing the mechanics of an 
adoption, Mrs. Stewart did indicate that as the hospital holds 
the baby for at least four days after birth, she would wait 
for two or three days after the birth of the baby before 
securing the consent so as to be sure that Plaintiff was not 
under the influence of any anaesthetic. (R. 51) 
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Prior to her conversation with her doctor brother and 
Dr. Hebertson, Plaintiff had not considered placing her baby 
for adoption. ( R. 55) There is no evidence that she ever 
unequivocally determined to do so. (R. 63) When querried 
on the subject she only replied that Dr. Hebertson felt it was 
for the best. ( R. 66) 
On December 15 at about 9 :30 p.m. Plaintiff's mem-
branes ruptured and she went to the hospital. She was sent 
home and told to return when the labor pains started. At 
approximately 3 :00 a.m. the next morning (December 16) 
irregular contractions began and at 4 :30 a.m. she was ad-
mitted to the hospital. (Exhibit 2-P, "Inpatient Admission 
Record"; Ibid, "Staff Notes") On admittance she appeared 
"apprehensive and very quiet." (Ibid. "Nurses Notes" 
and Observations") She continued with irregular, hard con-
tractions until noon. By that time she was complaining bit-
terly with pain. (lbit 1• "Staff Notes") Beginning at noon 
a very vigorous attempt at stimulation of labor was made. 
(Ibid.) At ~ :45 p.m. Plaintiff was very upset and crying. 
(Ibid. "Nurses Notes and Observations"') Finally at 5 :00 
p.m. it was decided to rest Plaintiff because she had had a 
fatiguing day, and she was sedated for the night. ( R. 117) 
She slept intermittently with periodic contractions. (Ibid.) 
On the following morning (December 17) it was concluded 
that Plaintiff vmuld not deliver normally and that it would 
be necessary to take the child by Caeserian section. (R. 61) 
During that morning Plaintiff was kept under sedation with 
various drugs, (Ibid. "Nurses Notes and Observations) 
and at 1 :45 p.m. the delivery procedure was begun. At 2 :07 
the infant was born and at 3 :20 p.m. Plaintiff was returned 
to the ward "apprehensive." (Ibid.) Medication was re-
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sumed at 3 :30 p.m. and among other drugs she was given 
Vistaril, a narcotic. At 6 :45 p.m. she was given Demora!, 
another narcotic. At 2 :30 a.m. the following morning (De-
cember 18) she was given another dosage of Demora!. Again 
at 9 :40 a.m. another dosage of Demora! was given. 
During the morning of December 18, Plaintiff was 
crying "off and on," was having a "severe headache" and 
abnormal discomfort. (Ibid. "Nurses Notes and Observa-
tions") At approximately 1 :00 p.m. a sister, Barbara, came 
to visit with Plaintiff. (R. 63) The nurse on duty, Mrs. 
Jerominski told Barbara Plaintiff was under sedation and 
needed rest. ( R. 65, 138) Barbara stayed with Plaintiff un-
til approximately 3 :05 p.m., during which period both were 
crying. (R. 64, 132) There was little conversation between 
the two women because Plaintiff didn't seem to know the 
sister was there, wasn't really coherent, and "just wasn't 
like herself." (R. 63, 66) 
At 3 :05 a brother, Bill, came to visit Plaintiff and 
Barbara left. (R. 64) Bill attempted to discuss the adoption 
of the baby but likewise found it difficult to visit with Plain-
tiff. She had a very vague appearance, apparently not know-
ing whether it was morning or afternoon, and repeatedly 
asked the time of day. (R. 69) Bill was in the room about 
five minutes when Mrs. Stewart from Defendant Agency 
arrived. When Mrs. Stewart entered the room Bill left, re-
maining outside in the hallway for approximately 35 minutes 
until Mrs. Stewart left, and then reentering the room. While 
waiting in the hall he heard Mrs. Stewart explain to Plain-
tiff that she was there to have the papers signed, but he did 
not hear any reply from Plaintiff. (R. 70) Bill claims that 
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as Mrs. Stewart left the room she said to him, "I have 
Dana's signature on the paper. For a minute I didn't think 
she would sign, but I finally got her signature." (R. 71) 
Mrs. Stewart recalled the conversation but denies that she 
said "I was afraid that she wouldn't sign ... " (R. 107) 
When Bill returned to the room Plaintiff appeard very de-
pressed and crying. Finding it impossible to carry on a con-
versation with her, he left the room in approximately 10 
minutes. 
The last thing Plaintiff remembers prior to the birth 
of the baby is a visit from Dr. Hebertson in her room at 
which time he said " ... we are going to take the baby to-
morrow at 1 :00 o'clock." Her first recollection after the 
birth of the child is a vague awareness of her brother Bill 
sitting by her bedside. She does not remember the visit with 
her sister Barbara nor the visit with Mrs. Stewart. The next 
thing the Plaintiff remembers after the visit with her 
brother Bill is a visit from Dr. Hebertson which she thought 
was the following day. (R. 49-50) 
Mrs. Stewart called Plaintiff by telephone at the hos-
pital on December 17, following delivery, explaining that 
she would come the following day to secure the consent to 
the adoption. (R. 94-100) Plaintiff does not remember this 
call. When Mrs. Stewart visited with Plaintiff on the 18th, 
Plaintiff appeared to recognize her immediately and this 
was surprising to Mrs. Stewart because they had met only 
once before. It did not appear to Mrs. Stewart that Plaintiff 
had been crying but she did start crying while Mrs. Stewart 
was in the room and was crying when Mrs. Stewart left. 
(R. 100) Mrs. Stewart discussed the release form and in-
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structed Plaintiff as to how to fill in and sign her name, 
which she did while Mrs. Stewart was in the room. (R. 96) 
Mrs. Stewart recalls that Plaintiff remarked prior to sign-
ing the release, "Yes, I might as well do it now." (R. 96, 
105) Plaintiff seemed responsive to Mrs. Stewart. (R. 96) 
Nurse Jerominski attended Plaintiff on December 18 
from approximately 9 :00 a.m. to 2 :30 p.m. (R. 130) During 
this time Plaintiff was very cooperative, nice and did every-
thing asked by Mrs. Jerominski, though crying off and on. 
(R. 131) Dr. Hebertson visited plaintiff on December 18 at 
approximately 8 :00 a.m. but did not see her again until 
6: 10 p.m. ( R. 121, 122) 
The infant was never shown to Plaintiff and was taken 
from the hospital by Mrs. Stewart on December 21. (R. 98) 
The infant was placed by Defendant Agency with third per-
sons on December 22. (R. 97) The Plaintiff was released 
from the hospital on December 23. (R. 51) 
On December 31, 1966, eight days after being re-
leased from the hospital, Plaintiff contacted the doctor 
in regard getting the infant back. (R. 51) She conferred 
with him but he advised her nothing could be done. On 
January 5, 1967, contact was made with the worker of De-
fendant Agency for the same purpose and Plaintiff was 
advised to get an attorney and discuss the matter with 
him. (R 106). On January 9, 1967, 23 days after the birth 
of the child, petition for writ of Habeas Corpus was filed. 
(R. 1-3) 
The identity of the persons with whom the baby was 
placed by Defendant Agency was not revealed at the time 
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of trial and no evidence was proferred as to said persons. 
It was acknowledged by counsel for Defendant Agency 
that as of the date of trial no petition for adoption had 
been filed by said persons. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT INQUIRY IN HABEAS CORPUS PRO-
CEEDING REGARDING CUSTODY OF CHILD-
REN IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE; THIS BEING 
SO THE APPELLATE COURT MAY REVIEW 
QUESTIONS OF BOTH LAW AND FACT, AND 
ENTER SUCH A DECREE AS JUSTICE RE-
QUIRES. 
At the trial of this matter counsel for the Defendant 
moved to strike paragraph 7 of the complaint, on the 
ground that in a habeas corpus proceeding the only thing 
before the Court is legality of restraint. ( R. 35) The Court 
denied the motion and rightly so. However, we feel con-
strained to reargue the point because of the significance 
thereof and as prologue to the ensuing Points of this Brief. 
Rule 72, URCP, provides that "In equity cases the 
appeal may be on questions of both law and fact." 
Admittedly, the prevailing approach seems to con-
sider a habeas corpus proceeding on the law side of the 
court. (5 Am. Jur. 2d, APPEAL AND ERROR, Section 
9 
871) However, where the custody of children is involved 
a different approach has been taken by our Court. In the 
case of Jones 1·s. Moore, et al, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191 
(1923) Justice Frick stated: 
"While it is true that the proceeding, in form at 
least, is habeaus corpus proceeding, it is, however, so 
merely as a matter of convenience to the parties and 
to expedite a hearing upon the issues. No case in-
volving the custody of minor children has ever been 
tried or considered in this jurisdiction as merely a 
habeas corpus proceeding, although the case in form 
is such. In habeas corpus proceedings nothing is 
inquired into except the legality of the restraint, 
and if it be found that the petitioner is illegally de-
prived of his liberty, but one conclusion is permis-
sible, and that is that the same must be restored to 
him. Where, as here, however, the sole issue in-
volved is who shall have the custody, care and edu-
cation of a child, and especially one of tender years 
the inquiry extends far beyond the ordinary issues 
involved in a habeas corpus proceeding. Cases like 
the one at bar partake of all of the incidents of a 
proceeding in equity. Indeed, under our procedure, 
-- it has become a proceeding which is equitable in the 
highest degree, as clearly appears from the decisions 
in all of the cases decided by this court, where the 
right to the custody, nurture, care and education of 
children was the controlling issue." (Cases Cited) 
The same rule is adopted and discussed historically by 
Justice Wade in Walton vs. Koffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P 2d 
97 ( 1946), and was most recently confirmed by our Court in 
the case of lt'ilson i·s. Pierce, 14 Utah 2d 317, 383 P. 2d 
925 ( 1963), wherein Justice Crockett stated: 
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"Such proceedings are equitable in nature. In fact, 
because of the bearing they may have on the entire 
course of the life of the child, they are sometimes 
said to be equitable in the highest degree, and the 
court will scrutinize the proceeding with especial 
care in the interest of the child." 
POINT II. 
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A 
FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF AT THE 
TIME SHE EXECUTED THE RELEASE IN-
STRUMENT ASSIGNING ALL RIGHTS TO HER 
INF ANT CHILD TO DEFENDANT AGENCY 
HAD FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF HER ACT, AND WAS 
NOT ACTING UNDER ANY UNDUE INFLU-
ENCE, RESTRAINT, MENACE, FRAUD OR 
OTHER ACTION WHICH DEPRIVED HER OF 
HER FREE AND VOLUNTARY ACTION IN SO 
DOING. 
After hearing in the trial court it was found by the 
District Judge that at the time of the execution of the 
Release and consent Plaintiff had full knowledge of the 
nature and consequences of her act and was not acting 
under any undue influence, restraint, menace, fraud or other 
action which deprived her of her free and voluntary action 
in so doing. (R. 20). Based on this Finding the District 
Judge concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to the 
custody and control of the minor child involved (R. 20) 
and decreed that Plaintiff should be judically deprived of all 
right in and claim to the minor child. (R. 2) 
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We submit the evidence did not support a finding that 
there was no undue influence and as a matter of fact the 
preponderence of the evidence was directly to the contrary. 
Section 78-30-4 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
provides: 
"A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the 
consent of its parents, if living, nor an illegitimate 
child without the consent 0f its mother, if living, 
. . . ; provided, that the district court may order 
the adoption of any child, without notice to or con-
sent in court of the parent or parents thereof, when-
ever it shall appear that the parent or parents whose 
consent would otherwise be required have thereto-
fore, in writing, acknowledged before any officer 
authorized to take acknowledgements, released his 
or her or their control or custody of such child to 
any agency licensed to receive children for place-
ment or adoption ... " 
As will be argued at a later time, we question the ap-
plication of said statute in the instant case insofar as the 
right Plaintiff to revoke her Release is concerned, since 
an adoption proceeding had not been instituted regarding 
the child involved. Nevertheless, we submit this section 
establishes the legislative intent that a legal and lawful 
release to the child placing agency by a person competent 
to make same is required before said child can be subse-
quently placed for adoption and the natural parent deprived 
of legal rights thereto. 
The type of freely given act or consent necessary by 
a natural parent is defined as follows: 
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"Legal consent to adoption means consent fully and 
voluntarily given, and includes consent to all the 
legal consequences of adoption. Legal consent does 
not exist where it is obtained through fraud, duress 
or other overreaching practices, or other circum-
stances which justify the conclusion that the con-
sent was not fully and voluntarily given." (2 Am. 
Jur. 2d, ADOPTION, Section 44; 24 ALR 2d 1127 
(1952) 
a. It is submitted that in the instant case Plaintiff's 
consent was not freely and voluntarily given because the 
release was not signed as her independent act but rather 
under the cumulative undue influence and persuasion of 
her doctor brother, her attending physician and the social 
workers with whom she consulted. 
Undue influence is not clearly defined by the courts 
and is largely determined by the circumstances of each 
particular case. (2 Am. Jur. 2d, ADOPTION, Section 35) 
A commonly accepted test, however, seems to be whether 
or not the full agency of the person influenced was taken 
from him or destroyed, and in its place the will of another 
person substituted. (Ibid., Section 36.) It seems abundantly 
clear from the record that Plaintiff, at the time she signed 
the agency Release, was not exercising her full agency, but 
rather substituting the will and desire of her doctor and 
the agency representative. There is no evidence that she 
ever unequivocally expressed her desire to release the 
child. Up to the very minute she signed her name, as di-
rected, she was upset and undecided regarding the matter 
and apparently signed only as one defeated by the circum-
stances and resigned to the wishes of others - "I might as 
well," she said. 
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Neither the doctor, nor the social worker held a gun 
or threatened physical violence, but undue influence is 
ordinarily not the subject of and is seldom established by 
direct influence; rather it is usually established by proof of 
a collection of facts and circumstances from which an in-
ference of undue influence may be drawn. ( Ibid., Section 
47) It is a much more subtle influence than gun or club, 
but equally deadly. 
It is obvious that Plaintiff was unusually amenable to 
influence because of her mental and physical condition. 
This peculiar susceptibility to influence, together with the 
confidential relationship existing between herself, and the 
doctor, and herself and the social worker, creates a pre-
sumptive inference of undue influence. (Ibid., Sections 37, 
47) This being the case, Defendant had a burden of re-
butting such a presumption, and going forward with per-
suasive evidence that Plaintiff was in fact not unduly per-
suaded to the action taken. None of the confidants involved 
gave any enl'.ouragement or assistance in relation to keeping 
the baby. Though Mrs. Stewart apparently explained the 
mechanics of adoption and the help available in relation 
thereto, she failed to explain help available should Plaintiff 
keep the baby. "She didn't ask this so I didn't offer it. 
There wasn't any time where we reached that point in 
counselling." (R. 104). It is obvious and so stated that the 
doctor and social workers felt adoption the right action to 
take and in the best interests of all concerned. No one 
questions their right to such judgment, nor perhaps their 
right to express and suggest same, but the question becomes, 
how far and in what degree are they justified in urging 
such judgment. At what point does their thinking translate, 
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superimpose upon and become the thinking of the mother? 
In this case that point came and their will became sub-
stituted for Plaintiffs to the point where she did not fully 
and voluntarily make up her own mind regarding perhaps 
the most important decision of her life. 
Plaintiff's consent was taken within 24 hours of the 
birth of her baby, by a person predetermined that this was 
the thing to do and who had already made arrangements 
and committments for the placement of the child, while 
plaintiff was extremely upset emotionally, physically im-
paired in both mind and judgment, still within the influence, 
confinement and atmosphere of doctor and hospital, and 
without the impartial advice of a judge as to the signifi-
cance and legal consequences of her act. In this light one 
shudders at the legislative preference given to an agency 
adoption in so far as the rights of the natural parent are 
involved. We wonder as to why the distinction between 
agency and non-agency in the matter of consent and tend to 
agree with ,Justice Henroid as to the meaninglessness of 
such destinction. (See concuring opinion, Taylor, et al vs. 
Waddaups, et u;i:, 121 Utah 279, 241 P 2d 157 (1952) ) . The 
reason for the distinction is, of course, because the Legis-
lature has made the distinction. But it being so, and dan-
gerously so, it behooves this Court, as is suggested by 
Justice Callister in Thomas vs. Children's Aid Society of 
Ogden, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P 2d 1029, ( 1961), to make a 
careful review of the record as to duress or coercion. 
b. The Finding enunciated by the District Judge, in 
addition to negating any undue influence, finds that Plain-
t.iff had full knowledge of the nature and consequences of 
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her act. We submit this conclusion was also specifically in 
error and that a finding directly to the contrary is supported 
by the facts. 
At the moment of truth when the Release form was 
signed, only one other person was in the presence of Plain-
tiff; to-wit, Mrs. Stewart. (We attach little significance to 
the signing of the Hospital Release form three days later 
on December ~1, since this was signed by Plaintiff after the 
fact, when fully aware of her previous signature and as a 
routine matter with little significance. (R. 152) ) Mrs. 
Stewart found Plaintiff responsive and able to fill in the 
necessary forms as directed. Though apparently a com-
petent social worker with many years of experience, she 
was neither doctor, nurse, nor expert in the field of psy-
chological response. She made no attmpt to ascertain the 
patients' condition (R. 101) but entered the room unan-
nounced. Whether patient was sitting up or lying down, 
she isn't quite sure (R. 97, 105) but she knows Plaintiff 
signed the papers which were brought for that purpose. She 
doesn't remember much that was said during the 30 minutes 
she spent in the room, but she specifically remembers what 
she did not say to brother Bill as she left the room. (R. 107) 
She does remember that when she left the room Plaintiff 
was crying. She can't remember previous discussions with 
Plaintiff about the time for taking the consent, but she 
can remember that on the afternoon after surgery she 
called and announced her visit scheduled for the next day. 
If she did call, no wonder Plaintiff, heavily sedated di-
rectly after the delivery of a child by Caeserian section, 
doesn't remember the conversation. 
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Mrs. Stewart's memory, being as it is, one wonders 
what really happened during that one half hour visit. What 
was said, how did Plaintiff react and respond, specifically? 
The fact that Plaintiff was able to read a paper, fill in the 
blanks and sign her name just as instructed, seems to us of 
little consequence. A six year old child could do as much. 
But did she know what she was doing, did she understand 
the significance thereof? 
Dr. Hebertson, from his own testimony and the record, 
did not see Plaintiff from 8 a.m. to 6 :10 p.m. on that fate-
ful day. She had no history of reaction to narcotics so he 
had no reason to suspect any unusual behavior on her part. 
But he did not see her, and he did not know her mental state 
at 2 :30 p.m. Unlike Dr. Clark, a psychiatrist, teacher at 
the University of Utah medical school, and expert in the 
field of psycho-pharmacology, who hesitated to testify re-
garding obstetrics (R. 79), Dr. Hebertson, an obstetrician, 
with no special training regarding drugs and their effect, 
didn't hesitate to testify about the effect of drugs. 
Nor was nurse Jerominski a psychiatrist or one trained 
in the effect of drugs. All she knew really was that Plaintiff 
was a nice, cooperative, patient who seemed to know what 
she was doing. Bill and Barbara, however, who knew their 
sister much better than the others mentioned, found her 
behavior to be very unlike her normal self; not just that 
she was emotional and crying, but that she seemed as in 
a trance and unable to converse with them in her usual way. 
Barbara spent two hours with Plaintiff prior to the signing 
of the consent. Her description of Plaintiff's behavior would 
seem very critical. 
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We submit that the only competent expert testimony 
concerning whether or not Plaintiff had full knowledge of 
the nature and consequences of her act came from Dr. 
Clark. Dr. Clark considered the following factors: 
(I) Repeated questions by Plaintiff as to time of day. 
(R. 78, 82) 
(2) Inability of Plaintiff to respond to conversations 
with Bill and Barbara. (R. 78) 
(3) The rolling of her head from side to side. (R. 77) 
( 4) Sleep deprivation. (R. 79) 
(5) Spotty memory loss. (R. 90) 
(G) After-effects of major surgery. (R. 79) 
(7) Inconsistency in spontaneous signing of name. 
(R. 80) 
(8) Recent and cumulative dosages of narcotic drugs. 
(R. 78) 
On the basis thereof he concluded that Plaintiff was 
under an organic fussional state, an acute brain syndrome, 
(R. 78) and that he would have questions about her com-
petency and her ability to weigh the evidence or the signi-
ficance of her decision because of the presence of impaired 
brain function. (R. 80, 83) This, as he explained, would 
not render her unable to fill in the blanks of a document, 
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or sign her name. (R. 84) She could even carry on a 
meaningful conversation. ( R. 85) She could do all these 
things even voluntarily, but still be under the influence of 
a disordered state of mind. (R. 88) In spite of incessant 
cross examination he persisted in his testimony that it 
was highly probable that organic impairment was present. 
(R. 85) About all counsel for Defendant could wring from 
Dr. Clark was an agreement to the meaningless proposition: 
if Plaintiff was normal - she was normal, a conclusion 
which, as the court pointed out, would be testified by any 
doctor. (R. 89, 90) 
The circumstances in this case are much less extrem1~ 
than have supported a finding of undue influence in other 
jurisdictions. In the case of Hammond vs. Chadwick, Tex. 
Civ. App., 199 SW 2d 547 (1947), a married woman dis-
covered she was pregnant while her husband was overseas, 
obviously by another man. The mother wrote her husband 
of this circumstance and he replied explaining that he was 
somewhat shocked and suggesting they place the child for 
adoption, to which she subsequently agreed. Prior to the 
birth of the baby a solicitious neighbor lady offered to adopt 
the baby when born, telling the mother that if she kept the 
baby it would cause trouble with her husband and she 
wouldn't have a happy home. Four days after the birth of 
the baby the mother returned home from the hospital and 
the baby was taken home by the neighbor lady. On the 
same day the mother, and father, who had returned home 
from overseas, signed a consent agreement in the presence 
of the neighbor lady and her lawyer. A petition for adop-
tion was filed next morning. Two and one-half months after 
signing the consent, the mother filed her objection in the 
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adoption proceeding claiming, among other things, that her 
consent was not freely given. The trial court granted the 
adoption, but the appellate court, after reviewing the evi-
dence, concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show 
that the instrument was freely executed, for at the time 
the mother executed same " ... she was laboring under a 
great mental strain and in fear that if she kept the child 
it would result in unhappiness to her family and cause a 
separation between herself and her husband." (p. 551) We 
are, of course, dealing in degrees of duress, but certainly 
our instant case, involving an unwed mother subject to 
pressures from both family and doctor with problems of 
support and social ostricism, presents a more extreme case 
of "mental strain". 
In the case of Allen vs. Morgan, 75 Ga. App. 738, 4·1 
E 2d 500 (1947), a child was born three months after a 
couple were married. The stepmother-in-law suggested that 
the baby be placed for adoption because her social standing 
was at stake. A month after the baby was born it was 
placed with a doctor who subsequently placed it with 
another family and a month later a consent to adoption was 
signed. Five months later the natural parents intervened 
in an adoption proceeding seeking return of the baby. The 
trial court denied the adoption and the adopting parents 
appealed. There was no allegation that any force or duress 
was used at the time the consent was signed. As a matter 
of fact the mother admitted she was willing to have the 
child adopted at that time. However, she claimed she did 
so under the pressure from her mother-in-law. The trial 
court found that the natural parents were suffering from 
" ... intense mental distress, which while not induced by the 
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petitioning parties, was of sufficient force to prevent them 
from freely exercising their own judgments, over the dis-
position of their child which was their most precious pos-
session." The appellate court affirmed, stating that not 
only did the evidence justify the trial court decision, but 
that if a trial court finds a consent is not freely and volun-
tarily given " ... it is its duty to deny the adoption." In its 
decision the court made the following significant comments: 
"Furthermore the contract of adoption is absolutely 
irrelevant and immaterial in an adoption case other 
than on the question of consent . . . If consent not 
embodied in a contract can be inquired into by the 
court and found not to exist if induced by the duress 
of anyone, it may do so where the consent is em-
bodied in a contract, and this because the contract 
is relevant so far as consent is concerned." 
In this case ''intense mental stress" prevented the natural 
parents from freely exercising their own judgment. The 
analogy to our instant case is obvious. 
In the case of In re Adoption of Susko, 363 Pa. 78, 69 
A 2d 132 ( 1949), a child, Timothy was born out of wed-
lock on July 8, 1947. The natural mother lived with her 
mother and seven brothers. Her brothers, upon becoming 
aware of her pregnancy were incensed and openly resented 
her presence in the home. They called her names and sug-
gested an abortion be performed. They accused her of 
being the cause of her mother's death, who died January, 
1948. After the birth of the baby the mother left it with 
various friends and relatives. Eventually, in February, 
1948, it came into the possession of petitioners and on 
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March 27, 1948 the mother signed an "irrevocable" con-
sent to its adoption. However in August she filed an answer 
to the Petition for Adoption and simultaneously filed a Writ 
of Habeas Corpus for the return of the child. She alleged 
that at the time she signed the consent she was confused 
because of her mother's recent death and "induced by the 
duress and undue influence of her seven brothers to deliver 
up the custody of the child." The trial judge found that the 
mother signed the consent under "unsurmountable duress 
and coercion". The appellate court affirmed, and in so 
doing said: 
"The affection respondent manifested for her child, 
the pressure under which she consented to give up 
the custody of the infant, together with the fact 
that within three months she sought its return, 
clearly controvert proof of an intent to abandon." 
Finally, we cite the case of Karr us. Wilke, Executive 
Director of the Nachusa Lutheran Horne for Children, et al, 
30 Ill. App. 2d 361, 174 N E 2d 897 (1961) which seems 
almost on all fours with our present case, except that our 
present case seems a much more aggravated situation. In 
the following report we have underscored the significant 
comparisons and contrasts with our instant case. 
A habeas corpus proceeding was filed by a natural 
mother to obtain custody of her inf ant child from a licensed 
child welfare agency and the adoptive parents. The circuit 
court quashed the writ and remanded custody to the adop-
tive parents and the natural mother appealed. 
The natural parents were young marrieds afraid that 
they could not care for the expected baby, their first. In 
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this frame of mind they visited the defendant agency and 
were advised that their only alternative, in fairness to the 
child, was to place it for adoption. The birth was an un-
eventual one. The consent of the mother was taken by the 
agency worker in the hospital approximately 96 hours, 
or 4 days, after the birth. She walked to a room in the hos-
pital where she signed the papers. The mother left the hos-
pital without the child and without ever seeing the child. 
The mother filed for the writ four months almost to the day 
from the date of birth. (Incidentally, the matter wasn't 
heard by the appellate court until 14 months later.) 
In her complaint the mother did not question the form 
of the surrenders or consents and admitted signing same, 
but alleged (1) that at the time of signing she was under 
the influence of drugs, in a weakened mental and physical 
condition, emotionally unstable, recovering from the effects 
of her first child birth, and by reason thereof was unable 
to comprehend the significance of her act, and (2) that she 
was misinformed as to the nature and effect of the instru-
ment which she signed and believed she could reacquire 
custody of the child. The defendant, among other things, 
claimed that the petitioner's surrender or consent was ir-
revocable. 
The appellate court reviewed the record, reversed the 
trial court, and returned the baby to the natural mother. 
The appeal court found the mother was not under the in-
fluence or effect of drugs or medications but specifically 
recognized that ". . . the time and place of the signing 
thereof and her then physical condition, which was obviously 
weakened and not normal, are material, relevant facts and 
circumstances bearing on the ultimate question of fact." 
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Reversal was made primarily on the grounds that because 
of concealment by her husband and the agency worker, she 
did not understand or comprehend the final effect of the 
consent instrument, but the other considerations herein 
mentioned obviously influenced the court. We do not suggest 
that an element of misrepresentation exists in our in-
stance case, but suggest that the same rule will apply, viz, 
that under the pressures, influences and circumstances 
Plaintiff did not know or adequately understand the drastic 
nature of her act in signing the paper as directed. 
The court in the Karr case, supra, was obviously in-
fluenced by certain considerations which we think should 
be equally influential on this Court. Apparently in that 
case, as in the instant case, concern was expressed as to 
the attachment of the adopting parents. In regard thereto, 
the court stated : 
"The respondents have no vested interest in the 
child, and, the petition herein having been filed ... 
less than four months after the birth of the child, 
they had little or no opportunity of developing love, 
affection, and attachment for the child, or the child 
for them. The petitioner acted reasonably promptly 
to try and obtain the child back." (Emphasis added) 
The court was also troubled in that case, as I believe 
this court should be in this case, with the urgency of the 
placement agency in securing the release. In our case the 
consent was taken just 24 hours after an eventful, major 
surgical process while the Plaintiff was under the effect of 
drugs, physically weakened and emotionally upset. Though 
the circumstances were not nearly so extreme, that court 
nonetheless said, 
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"It is not without significance that this purported 
surrender or consent was taken ... barely 96 hours 
or possibly less, after the birth of the child." (Em-
phasis added) 
That court then goes on to refer to a newly adopted Illinois 
statute not yet in effect at that time precluding the taking 
of consents within 72 hours of birth, and makes great fuss 
that the period actually involved was only 24 hours beyond 
that which the new statute would set as a minimum. Mrs. 
Stewart indicated it was a common practice for her agency 
to take consents within 24 hours of birth. We submit that 
in any case, and as a matter of law, this is too soon, and 
that the Defendant Agency should change its ways. Even 
the three or four days which Mrs. Stewart promised Plain-
tiff would in some cases be too soon. Every practicing attor-
ney knows that in a non-agency case where presence in a 
down-town court before an impartial judge is required, a 24 
hour period would be impossible. 
As the court found in the Illinois case, we urge in this 
case that under the circumstances the decision of the trial 
court was against the manifest weight of the evidence and 
the law. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT 
A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF KNOWINGLY 
AND VOLUNTARILY EXECUTED SAID RE-
LEASE PREDETERMINED THAT THIS WAS 
THE COURSE OF ACTION SHE WOULD TAKE 
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It was established early in the jurisprudence of this 
state and is an established rule that the trial court should 
not make findings of fact where there is no evidence to 
support them, and if it does so judgment influenced thereby 
will be reversed. In Hathaway vs. Mines, 42 Utah 520, 132 
P. 388 (1913) this court stated: 
"The finding of facts and entering of judgments are 
solemn acts, and no court should permit itself to 
make a finding of fact where the record is con-
clusive ... that there is absolutely no evidence to 
support such finding." 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record, aside 
from a self-serving statement by Dr. Hebertson (R. 127), 
that Plaintiff had predetermined to release her child for 
adoption. The evidence is that the first demand of plac-
ing her baby for adoption was made to Plaintiff by her 
brother doctor. Dr. Hebertson repeated the advice and 
referred Plaintiff to Miss Bridgewater. 
Plaintiff had one conversation with Miss Bridgewater 
before the birth of the baby. ( R. 144, 14 7) This was four 
months before the birth of the baby. (R. 144) Miss Bridge-
water made an appointment for Plaintiff with Mrs. Stewart. 
She met with Mrs. Stewart on one occasion, (R. 92) and 
filled out a preliminary heritage record (R. 93). This was 
approximately three months before the birth of the child 
and she did not see Mrs. Stewart again until after the birth 
of the child. Even though apparently both ladies recommend-
ed adoption there is no evidence that Plaintiff unequivocal-
ly committed herself to either lady in relation thereto. 
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Obviously as an unwed mother, badgered by her 
brother, influenced by her doctor, advised by the social 
workers, and concerned about money, she considered the 
possibility of adoption. But the evidence is that right up to 
the very day she signed the consent she had not made up her 
mind and was in doubt. Ten minutes before Mrs. Stewart 
entered her room unannounced and unexpected, Plaintiff, 
in her at least semi-rational moments, said, to her sister, 
"Barbara, I don't know. I just don't know if I can give 
it up. I don't know. I don't know." (R. 63) This doesn't 
sound like the calm and deliberate statement of a person 
predetermined to a course of action. Brother Bill called 
at the hospital on that fateful day for the very purpose of 
attempting to influence a decision yet to be made. (R. 69) 
We submit that there had been no decision nor was there 
ever any decision, except under pressure in a half delerious 
state, to relinquish custody of a child she wanted so badly. 
POINT IV. 
THAT UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTAN-
CES ADDUCED PLAINTIFF HAS A RIGHT 
TO REVOKE OR WITHDRAW ANY CONSENT 
GIVEN 
It was a conclusion of law by the District Judge that 
Plaintiff had no right to revoke or withdraw her consent 
to the adoption of her minor child. (R. 27) We submit this 
was an error of law made by the trial judge. 
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a. The question of "right to revoke consent" is not a 
new one before this court. It has been considered in at least 
three significant cases ; but of course, never within the con-
text of the facts and circumstances of the instant case. There 
follows a synthesis of these past cases, applying the rules 
laid down therein to our present situation. 
In the case of Taylor vs. Waddoups, et ux, supra, an 
agreement was made on March 1, 1950 that defendants 
would adopt four of plaintiff's children and custody was 
transferred thereto. On March 9, 1950, plaintiff and hus-
band signed a "Consent to Adoption" which was subsequent-
ly filed in the district court on January 5, 1951. On January 
8, 1951, the district court signed an order of adoption. Plain-
tiff secured a Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 26, 1951, 
nearly a year after signing the consent, and on April 22 the 
court granted plaintiff's motion to vacate the order of adop-
tion. The habeaus corpus and adoption cases were consoli-
dated for trial and the court awarded one child to plaintiff 
and three children to defendants. On appeal this court re-
versed and returned custody to the plaintiffs, the natural 
parents. 
There was no question as to whether or not the consent 
was freely given, but the court held it was not a legal consent 
because taken before a notary public, rather than before a 
judge as required by law. 
Of more importance, as that case bears on the instant 
case, than Justice Wolfe's language in the majority opinion, 
are comments made by two concurring judges. Justice Wade 
said, 
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"I concur on the ground that plaintiff had effectively 
revoked her consent to the adoption of these children 
before it was consumated, and there was no showing 
that she had deserted them." 
Justice Henroid said, 
"I concur in the result only-for two reasons: ( 1) 
that the purported order of adoption violated Title 
14-4-14 U.C.A. 1943, having been entered before the 
children had lived for one year in the home of the 
purported adopting parents, and (2) that priur to 
the filing of the petition for adoption the natural 
muther effecti1)ely revoked any consent to adoption 
that she may have given, a right generally conceded 
under the authorities, when applied to the facts of 
this case." (Emphasis added) 
Technically the case stands only for the proposition 
that an adoption decree can be reversed where there was no 
legal consent. But the concurring opinions recognize and 
confirm a "right to revoke"-by one justice at any time 
prior to consumation of the adoption, and by one justice at 
any time prior to the filing of the petition, under the facts 
of the case. Unfortunately, Justice Henroid didn't specify 
the facts he felt controlling. But in any event the "right to 
revoke" was recognized. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Henroid also discuss-
es at some length the technicality of requiring "physical 
presence" before the court in a non-agency adoption and 
points out the shallowness of distinguishing an agency adop-
tion from a non agency adoption in relation to consent. We 
have already endorsed and urged these same sentiments 
regarding agency adoptions. 
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In defense of the "physical presence" requirement, 
Chief Justice Wolfe, in the majority opinion does, however, 
make a very persuasive argument. He says: 
"The purpose of this requirement is that the court, 
representing the public, can see that the parents 
when they consent to the adoption of their children 
are inf o1'med and fully understand the effect of the 
act which they are performing. The court should 
endeavor to protect the parents from fraud, misrep-
resentation or undue influence in the obtaining of 
their consent. Oft times, consents of adoption are 
signed by parents while under great emotional 
strain, and, as in this case, they may be signed while 
the parent is suffering from discouragement and dis-
pair. To conduce the welfare of all concerned, this 
safeguard is established as an assurance that the 
parents have duly considered the consequence of 
their act. The Legislature has deemed this contract 
to be of too great importance to permit it to be signed 
before a notary public without the benefit of consul-
tation with, and supervision by a court." (Emphasis 
Added) 
This reasoning further points up the absurdity of the 
agency distinction-because after all, the agency worker is 
likewise nothing more than a notary public. If it is import-
ant that the natural parents be fully informed and fully 
understand the effect of their act and be protected from un-
due influence when under great emotional stress in a non-
agency case, why not equally so in an agency case? 
Justice Wolfe likewise seemed impressed by the fact 
that Plaintiff made a diligent attack on the voidable adop-
tion decree; to-wit, 48 days later, though actually one year 
after signing a consent and releasing custody of children. 
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It seems to us a fortiori that if this Court returned the 
children in the Taylor case, the same result should apply in 
the instant case. The Taylor case dealt with four children 
who had been in an adoptive home for over a year before 
efforts to recover were made. In our case the child had been 
in an adoptive home for less than a month before such effort 
was made. In the Taylor case there was no question of a vol-
untary consent, that issue being resolved on a legal techni-
cality. In our case there is a very real question as to the state 
of mind when the consent was given. The return of the chil-
dren in the Taylor case on a technicality and a refusal to do 
so in the instant case where very real issues of consent are 
concerned would seem like swallowing the proverbial camel 
and saving the gnat. 
Less than one year after the Taylor case, the case of In 
re Adoption of D. - - - - - -, 122 Utah 525, 252 P 2d 229 
(1953), was decided by this Court. In that case the natural 
mother did in fact sign a consent to adoption before a judge, 
and some 14 months after the placement of the child, and 
four months after the filing of the adoptive petition, at-
tempted to revoke the consent and recover the child. 
The evidence indicated that directly after the birth of 
the child the mother placed the child with relatives and 
showed little interest in the child for some two years. None-
theless, Plaintiff urged that she had the arbitrary right to 
revoke her consent at any time before the completeion of the 
adoption proceedings. 
Obviously influenced by the facts of the case and, in the 
interest of the child, this Court affirmed the district court 
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and held that plaintiff could not revoke her consent. Inter-
estingly enough, however, the court did not, though it had 
the opportunity to do so, flatly reputiate the "right to re-
voke" concept. Rather, this Court said by Justice Crockett 
that a consent freely and knowingly given cannot be 
arbitrarly revoked. The court stated the question and gave 
its answer as follows : 
"This question is presented: Does a parent who has 
appeared before a court in connection with an adop-
tion proceeding and voluntarily consented to the 
adoption of her child, have the right, arbitrarly and 
without cause, to revoke her consent, when as here 
the adoptive parents have accepted the child, kept it 
in their home for a considerable period of time so 
that mutual affections have developed, gone to the 
trouble and expense in providing care and in making 
a home for said child and have in all respects satis-
fied the 1'equirements of the law as to adoptive par-
ents? Our answer is that under these circumstances 
she has not such arbitrary right." (Emphasis added) 
The court then goes on to acknowledge that reading of 
many cases teaches that each depends upon its own facts. 
The court specifies such facts which we herewith set out, 
applying each to our particular case: 
1. The circumstances of the placement of the child : 
No application in present case. 
2. The circumstances under which consent was giv-
en: Highly questionable in present case. 
3. The length of time the adopting parents have had 
the child : Minimal in present case. 
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4. Any "vested rights" that have intervened: None 
in present case. 
5. Welfare of the child: No question that natural 
mother would be fit mother. 
6. Character of respective claimants: No question 
regarding Plaintiff. 
7. Diligence of natural parent in seeking return. In 
our case just 8 days after releasing child. 
Although not involving an agency adoption, the court 
was also obviously influenced by, and referred to the 
provisions of Section 55-10-42 U.C.A. 1953, which provided: 
"No parent ... who by instrument of writing sur-
renders ... the custody of a child to any childrens 
aid society ... shall thereafter ... be entitled to cus-
tody or control ... (of) ... any such child ... " 
This irrevokable agency consent statute was repealed 
by our legislature (Laws of Utah 1965, Chapter 165) and is 
no longer the law in this jurisdiction. It should have no in-
fluence on the determination of the instant case. In any 
event and regardless of its repeal, the Court, in referring 
to said statute and being influenced thereby, recognized 
that the individual circumstances will prevail even in an 
agency adoption and in spite of such statute by saying: 
"We are not here called upon to say whether under 
all circumstances this would prevent a revocation of 
a consent given to such an agency.'' 
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The D. - - - - - - case is obviously distinguishable on sev-
eral facts from our instant case. Nonetheless, we submit and 
subscribe to the general rule enunciated therein; to-wit, that 
consent freely and voluntarily given cannot be arbitrarily 
revoked after adoption proceedings have been commenced, 
relying upon this case as further recognition by this court 
of the right to revoke and authority for revocation under the 
circumstances of the case. 
In the case of Miller vs. Miller 8 Utah 2d 290, 333 P. 2d 
945 ( 1959), the court again refused to allow revocation of 
consent given in the presence of counsel and judge after a 
petition for adoption had been filed. However, the court, 
restating the ruling of the D. - - - - - - case in a positive way 
that a consent, even though freely and voluntarily given, 
could be withdrawn for good cause, recognized that: 
"Fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake and want 
of understanding might present a situation where 
the consent should be withdrawn ... " 
The court in this case was also influenced by the fact 
that the consent to adoption had been acted upon by the 
adopting parents in that they had filed their petition for 
adoption and incurred certain financial obligations. 
b. What appears to be the prevailing rule regarding the 
right to revoke, or at least the "trend" of the decisions is 
expressed as follows : 
" ... where a natural parent has freely and knowing-
ly given the requisite consent to the adoption of his 
or her child, and the proposed adoptive parents have 
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acted upon such consent by bringing adoption pro-
ceedings, the consent is ordinarily binding upon the 
natural parent and cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn 
as to bar the court from decrees of adoption, particu-
larly where, in reliance upon such consent, the pro-
posed adoptive parents have taken the child into 
their custody and care for a substantial period of 
time and bonds of affection, in the nature of a 'vested 
right' have been forged between them and the child." 
(Emphasis added. 156 ALR 1011 (1945) ) 
This rule and situation was specifically quoted and 
adopted by this court in the case of In re Adoption of 
D. - - - -. (supra) (See also 2 CJS ADOPTION, p. 386, para-
graph 4; 2 Am Jur 2d ADOPTION, Section 46) The annota-
tion cited (156 ALR 10, 11) further states: 
"On the whole, however, it can be said from the 
cases generally that the question whether a natural 
parent may effectively revoke previously given con-
sent so as to bar the granting of an adoption decree 
usually depends upon all circumstances of the par-
ticular case, including such a variety of matters as 
the terms of the particular adoption statute-which 
may, expressly or by clear implication control the 
solution of the situation; the circumstances under 
which consent was given; the length of time elapsing, 
and the conduct of the parties between the giving of 
consent and the attempted withdrawal; whether the 
withdrawal of consent was made before or after the 
institution of adoption proceedings; the nature of the 
natural parent's conduct with respect to the child 
both before and after consenting to its adoption ; and 
the 'vested rights' of the proposed adoptive parents 
with respect to the child." (Authorities Cited) 
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c. We call specific attention to the consideration as to 
whether or not the withdrawal of consent is attempted be-
fore the institution of the adoption proceedings. In all of the 
Utah cases as hereinabove cited, revocation was attempted 
after the adoption proceedings had been instituted. Our 
court apparently has not been faced with the specific situa-
tion where a revocation is attempted before the adoption 
proceedings are commenced. The only authority in this re-
gard is the concurring opinion of Justice Henriod in the 
Taylor case (supra) wherein he concurs with the majority 
on the grounds that the natural mother had effectively re-
voked her consent prior to the filing of the petition for 
adoption .. 
The question arose at the trial of this matter as to when 
the adoption proceeding had actually commenced. Counsel 
for Defendant Agency, took the position that the proceeding 
commenced upon the placement of the child in the home of 
third persons for adoption. In this regard, we refer the court 
to the case of In re Trimble's Adoption, 16 U. 2d 188, 398 P. 
2d 25 ( 1965). In that case, which tested the custody right of 
a natural father, and involved a jurisdictional question as to 
respective authority of the district court vs. the juvenile 
court in custody matters, Justice Callister forthrightly 
stated: 
"An adoption proceeding is commenced by filing a 
petition with the clerk of the district court." (See 
also Section 78-30-7 UCA 1953) 
This, of course, makes sense and is the right approach 
since there is no common law adoption. In this country the 
right or power to create by legal proceeding the relationship 
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of parent and child between persons not so related by nature 
exists only by virture of a statutory provision describing the 
conditions and procedure by which adoption may be made 
effective. (2 Am. Jur. 2d ADOPTION, Section 2) Until a 
petition is filed, the court has no jurisdiction to judically 
terminate parental rights in regard a child, the only issue 
being where a contest arises during said time, such as in the 
instant case, that of the custody and control of the child. Up 
until such proceedings are instituted and the jurisdiction of 
the court invoked, the natural parent may, with or without 
cause, revoke his consent since any prior release of custody 
by the natural parent is in and of itself against public policy 
and a contract for that purpose is specifically unenforceable. 
This rule is set forth and explained in the case of French vs. 
CathoUc Comrnunity League, 69 Ohio App. 442, 44 NE 2d 
113 (1942). This was a habeas corpus proceeding by one 
alleging himself to be the father of a certain illegitimate 
child to obtain its custody. The issue was whether or not the 
child's mother, after having surrendered the child into the 
permanent custody of a child placing agency for adoption, 
could withdraw that consent before a public body had acted 
upon such consent. The court stated, 
" ... it is well recognized in some of such instances 
that have reached judicial attention that the individ-
ual may withdraw a consent and approval at any 
time before the public body acts thereon." 
The court argues : 
"Keeping in mind the paramount thought for the 
child's welfare ... we ask ourselves 'Why should such 
an unfortunate mother be permitted to revoke her 
prior consent for relinquishment when she has not 
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been advised as to its acceptance and it has not yet 
been acted upon?' She might have given it up in con-
templation of death and thereafter made recovery. 
She may have been destitute and shortly thereafter 
acquired an inheritance and an ability to care for her 
offspring. Must she adopt her own child? Surely she, 
being a suitable person, it would have been a cruel 
society devoted to the welfare of children as is the 
appellee, to say you cannot reclaim your given word 
and have back your child." 
That this type of release is voidable, is verified in the 
case of Skaggs vs Cannon, 293, Ky. 795, 170 S.W. 2d 12 
( 1943). 
The rule is normally stated in the converse, to-wit. 
"That a freely given consent is not arbitrarily revocable 
where adoption proceedings have been instituted thereto." 
(See 138 ALR 1038) But, of course, this necessarily implies 
that the reverse is equally true, to-wit: That a consent to 
adoption is arbitrarily revocable before it has been acted 
upon by the institution of adoption proceedings. 
We submit, therefore, (1) that the natural mother has 
the right to revoke a consent, though freely given, with or 
without cause if not acted upon by the institution of adoption 
proceedings, and (2) that a natural mother has the right to 
revoke a consent even after the adoption proceedings have 
been commenced if (a) the consent was not freely and vol-
untarily given with full knowledge and understanding of 
the consequences thereof, or (b) for other good cause, taking 
into consideration the circumstances enumerated in the 
D. - - - - - - and Miller cases as herein before summarized. 
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The significance of our argument is that this court has rec-
ognized the right to revoke, saying only that it cannot be 
arbitrarily exercised after the consent has been acted upon. 
This, of course, is the direct antithesis of the position urged 
by defendants' counsel at the time of the trial to the effect 
that there is no right to revoke and that the only issue in a 
custody contest where placement has been made with an 
agency is whether or not the release was freely and volun-
tarily given, and the release in the first instance valid or 
invalid. To follow defendant's line of reasoning, makes of 
the agency more than simply a vehicle for the placement of 
children and puts the agency in the roll of a pseudo-natural 
parent with rights, once it has obtained custody of a child, 
to hold or otherwise dispose thereof. What if, in the instant 
case, the child had not been immeditely placed in a home, or 
what if the home was unsuitable or for any other reason an 
adoption proceeding was neither instituted nor concluded? 
Does the child-placing agency then become a permanent 
home with judicial rights in and to said child without the 
institution of adoption proceedings. We remind the court 
that a one-year period after the placing of a child in a home 
before the adoption becomes final is required. (Section 78-
30-14 UCA 1953, as amended) It was obviously contemplat-
ed by the legislature that there might be situations where the 
placing of a child does not necessarily result in the adoption 
thereof and this circumstance adds weight to numerous 
authorities (See 138 ALR 1038; 156 ALR 1011), supporting 
a position that a consent may be revoked at any time up to 
the final adoption decree, or even beyond if good cause is 
shovm. We do not argue the extension of the arbitrary rules 
up to the time of the final adoption decree, recognizing that 
in our jurisdiction the D. - - - - - - case has invoked a non-
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arbitrary requirement after adoption proceedings have been 
commenced, but we do submit as argued herein that an ar-
bitrary right to revoke does exist up to the time a consent 
is acted upon by the institution of adoption proceedings. 
d. We recognize the rule that in habeas corpus proceed-
ings involving the custody of a child, the welfare of the child 
is, as a general rule, controlling. Walton vs. Koffman, supra 
and cases cited therein). In the Walton case, Justice Wade 
reviews in some detail the decision of Judge Ellett in the 
district court on the facts involved by which certain infant 
children were returned to the custody of a natural mother 
apparently on the basis of her primary right thereto. He 
then reverses the district court and returns the children to 
the grandparent. Obviously the Appellate Court, determined 
this was the best course of action, nonetheless had great 
difficulty in justifying its position, and in the end condi-
tioned the result by stipulating that the award to the grand-
parents was not necessarily permanent. Much of interest 
is said and quoted in the opinion, including the adoption of 
previous holdings of this court in relation to the circum-
stance of an unwed mother, to-wit: 
" ... the testimony is conclusive that the plaintff 
(the natural parent) is a morally fit person to have 
the care and custody of her child ... is the mere fact 
that the plaintiff is unmarried of great importance 
in this case? All the authorities are to the effect that 
her legal rights are not impaired by that fact." 
(Harrison vs. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 P. 716) 
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In the instant case there was no question as to the fit-
ness and ability of Plaintiff to care for the child ( R. 123), 
and so the illegitimacy of the child should have no influence 
on the decision in this matter. 
In the lt'alton case the court was faced with the perplex-
ing problem as to whether, all other things being equal, the 
interests of the child are paramount to the rights of the nat-
ural parents thereto. A "compromise" rule was adopted es-
tablishing a presumption that it is in the best interest and 
welfare of the child to be reared unded the care, custody and 
control of its natural parent. The rule is stated as follows: 
"We conclude that the determining consideration in 
a case of this kind is: what will be for the best in-
terest and welfare of the child. That in determining 
this question there is a p1·esumption that it will be 
for thE' best interest and welfare of the child to be 
reared under the care, custody and control of its nat-
ural parent; that this presumption is not overcome 
unless from all of the evidence, the trier of the facts 
is satisfied that the welfare of the child requires that 
it be awarded to someone other than its natural par-
ent Thus the ultimate burden of proof on this ques-
tion is alicays in favor of the parent and against the 
other person." (Emphasis Added) 
We submit that there is nothing in the record of this 
case nor was there anything stated or argued at the trial to 
overcome this presumption; to-wit, that it would be for the 
best interest and welfare of the child to be reared under the 
care and control of Plaintiff. The Walt on court argued that 
this presumption is based on both logic and natural interest, 
stating: 
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"The common experience of mankind teaches 'that 
blood is thicker than water,' that usually there is a 
much stronger attachment between a natural parent 
and child than is developed between a child and fos-
t<'.r parent, that the natural parent is willing to sac-
rifice its own interests and welfare for the benefit 
of the child much more than is the case Wl' h foster 
parents, and that generally the natural parent is 
more sympathetic and understanding and better able 
to get the confidence and love of its own child than 
anyone else. All of these things are especially true of 
the natural mother, that these facts should always be 
kept in mind throughout the trial and given due 
weight along with all the other evidence in the case 
in determining what will be for the best interest and 
welfare of the child." 
If the best interest and welfare of the child is to be the 
determining factor in the instant case, we suggest and sub-
mit that this Court has no choice but to return custody and 
control to the Plaintiff. 
e. Finally, we remind the court of its previously ex-
pressed concern for the rights of the natural mother. In the 
D. - - - - - - case, supra, the court stated: 
"In considering the question of duress, we do not 
overlook the fact that often a natural parent, part-
ticularly a young mother left alone with the respon-
sibility of a child, because of economic conditions or 
other circumstances, in order to avoid shame, embar-
rassment or hardship to herself or others, or out of 
solicitude for the child, may be an easy prey to undue 
influence of designing or coniving persons. There-
fore, whenever such a charge is made, the Court 
should carefully scrutinize the evidence lest an hon-
42 
est, worthy and well-meaning natural parent be un-
justly deprived of her child." 
And in the Thomas case (supra.), though plaintiff had 
set forth no facts in its brief to support the charge of duress 
and coercion, the court nevertheless carefully examined the 
record in regard thereto, stating: 
"This, because in cases of this nature, an unmarried 
mother may be easy prey to undue influences. And, 
the evidence must be carefully reviewed to avoid the 
mother being unjustly deprived of her child." 
This court has recognized the primary right of the nat-
ural parent, has recognized the right to revoke consent under 
the circumstances of the case, and has waxed eloquent as to 
its concern for the protection of the unwed, natural mother. 
The instant case seems to comply right down the line with 
the circumstances and conditions stipulated by this court as 
to justify the revocation of consent. The manifst weight of 
the evidence establishes that the Plaintiff in signing the 
release did not know the nature of her act and was under 
undue influence in relation thereto, which circumstance, 
even without any other, justifies revocation of consent and 
leaves this court no choice but to return custody of the child. 
Certainly this case is a classic one, supporting the revocation 
of consent and return of custody. We urge the Court to give 
more than mere lip service to the lofty ideals, rules and con-
siderations previously expressed, to reverse the order of the 




THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE REGARDING OR OTHERWISE SUP-
PORTING ITS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AL-
LEGING THAT THE CHILD HAD BEEN 
PLACED IN A SUIT ABLE AND PROPER HOME 
FOR ADOPTION, AND THAT ABSENCE OF A 
FINDING ON THIS ISSUE PRECLUDED THE 
AWARD OF CUSTODY AND CONTROL TO DE-
FENDANT AGENCY. 
In its answer, Defendant Agency plead as an affirma-
tive defense that the child had been placed by Defendant in 
a suitable and proper home for adoption. (R. 11) At the 
trial, however, the identity of the parents with whom the 
child had been placed was carefully concealed and no evi-
dence whatsoever was introduced as to the suitability of said 
home. As indicated in the D. - - - - - - case, the character of 
the respective claimants to the child is one circumstance to 
be considered by the court in deciding whether or not con-
sent may be revoked. Though the character of the prospec-
tive adoptive parents is not critical should the court find in 
favor of the natural parent, it is obviously critical if the 
court finds in favor of the Defendant. 
It is also elementary (See Hathaway case, supra.) that 
the findings must be responsive to the issue raised. An issue 
as to the suitability of the home in which Defendant Agency 
has placed the child was raised by Defendant. Failure to 
introduce evidence in relation thereto, if nothing else, jus-




In Summary, the Plaintiff's position is as follows: 
1. That an inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings regard-
ing custody of children is highly equitable in nature. The 
court may review questions of both law and fact and enter 
such a decree as justice requires. 
2. That the persuasions of an offended brother, and per-
sons in whom a special confidence had been entrusted; to-
wit, her doctor and the social workers, unduly influenced 
Plaintiff to sign a release which in fact she never intended, 
of her own free will, to do. 
3. That at the time Plaintiff signed the Release she was 
under the influence of narcotic drugs, under such mental 
strain and distress, in such a weakened mental and physical 
condition, and so emotionally unstable as to not have full 
knowledge and understanding of the nature and consequen-
ces of her act. 
4. That Plaintiff had never predetermined to release 
custody of her child for purpose of adoption. 
5. That the Court must be as equally concerned that 
Plaintiff understand the consequences of signing her con-
sent before an agency worker as the courts and legislature 
are concerned in connection with the signing of such a con-
sent before a judge where no agency is involved. 
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6. That Plaintiff had a right to revoke her Release and 
consent to adoptive proceedings, 
a. arbitrarily, prior to her consent being acted upon 
by the institution of adoptive proceedings, 
b. for good cause, as shown under the circumstances 
of the case, at any time. 
7. That there was insufficient evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption that it would be in the best interest and welfare of 
the child to be reared under the care, control and custody of 
, Plaintiff. 
8. That the failure of Defendant to go forward with 
evidence as to the suitability of the prospective adoptive 
home precluded a judicial deprivation of the primary right 
of Plaintiff as the natural mother. 
9. That the courts failure to make findings on issues 
raised by the pleadings necessitates, if nothing else, a new 
trial. 
At the trial of this matter witnesses for the defendant 
seemed to feel that the agency involved and its workers were 
the ones on trial-the custody of the child was a secondary 
concern. Much was said in oral argument by defendants' 
counsel about the adverse effect upon placement agencies 
and the uncertainty in adoptive procedures which would 
result should the trial Judge rule in favor of the Plaintiff. 
The trial Judge, by his own admission, was much concerned 
about such consequences and no doubt his final judgment 
was influenced thereby. 
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To this concern we answer : justice in this case, on the 
facts of this case, should not be determined by possible con-
sequences under other situations. Though we are critical of 
the agency and its workers, this of course was not our real 
concern. We were not really talking about agencies or con-
tracts or hospital procedures or doctors practices. We were 
talking about a mother, a human being, and her infant child, 
blood of her blood and bone of her bone. A woman who has 
had one child and perhaps may never have another. A 
woman who has fulfilled her God-given destiny, only to see 
her accomplishment snatched away by the cruel claws of 
social pressure, outraged morality, indignant persons who 
felt imposed upon. The adoptive parents may yet adopt an-
other child-a child in fact not wanted, and who needs their 
love and care. For Plaintiff this may be paradise lost. We 
urge the Court not to compound the social felony perpetrated 
upon a woman who aches for the soul she stirred. Why can't 
an unwed mother who is good and loves her child raise that 
child to be a useful citizen any less than the widowed or the 
divorced mother? If there is a cause, a distorted society 
dictates same, not God or reason. 
Where such good grounds exist both in law and in fact 
as in this case, we respectfully urge the Court to reverse the 
judgment of the district court. 
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